Professor Kristie Miller, University of Sydney

We often say that some actions are imprudent, and that we ought not be imprudent.

Often what we mean when talk of imprudence is that our current selves are acting in ways that disadvantage our later selves. We spend now, instead of saving. We put off the unpleasant dental trip for later. We make things better for our current self, at the expense of our later (or earlier) selves. Most philosophers think this is irrational and we shouldn’t do it.  But there is good evidence that most people have so-called time-biased preferences. They prefer that things go better for some of their selves, compared to others. For instance, at the Centre for Time we have consistently found that people prefer that things go better for their future selves compared to their past ones. Most people prefer to have an operation that is ten times longer and more painful, as long as it was yesterday and not tomorrow. But is that rational? Is it OK to treat some of our selves better than others, just because of where in time they happen to be?

I’ll consider what philosophers have had to say on this matter, in light of lots of new empirical research on what our preferences are like.

Philosophy at Otago is pleased to present the first of our two public Dan and Gwen Taylor Lectures for 2024. This lecture is presented by Professor Kristie Miller from the University of Sydney, Director of the Centre for Time.

Visit the Centre for Time website